Optimal financial contracting and debt maturity structure under adverse selection by Jorge Fernández Ruiz
OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 
AND DEBT MATURITY STRUCTURE 
UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION 
Jorge Fernández Ruiz* 
El Colegio de México 
Resumen: Analizamos un modelo en el que un país averso al riesgo financia su 
proyecto de desarrollo bajo información asimétrica. Antes de que este 
proyecto rinda sus frutos, se producen dos tipos de noticias, una de 
las cuales reduce la asimetría inicial de información entre el país y 
los inversionistas. Caracterizamos el contrato financiero óptimo bajo 
estas circunstancias, tanto en el caso en que se dispone de contratos 
financieros completos, como en el que el país solamente puede contratar 
deuda de corto y largo plazo. 
Abstract: We analyze a model in which a risk-averse country finances its de-
velopment project under asymmetric information. Before the project 
renders its fruits, two types of news will become available, one of which 
will reduce the asymmetry of information between the country and its 
investors. We characterize the optimal financial contract both when 
complete financial contracting is possible and when the country is re-
stricted to using only short-term and long-term debt. 
J EL Classifications: F34, Gl 5 
Fecha de recepción: 6 II 2001 Fecha de aceptación: 22 VI 2001 
* This paper owes much to helpful discussions with E. Martinez Chombo. I am 
also grateful for very useful comments from an anonymous referee. Any remaining 
errors are my own. 
37 38 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
1. Introduction 
Recent experiences in Mexico and other developing countries have 
shown that international debt problems can arise not only as a re-
sult of large debts -properly measured in relative terms- but also as 
a result of its maturity profile. A given amount of debt may have 
very different consequences depending on its maturity structure. In 
particular, in the Mexican case, it has been argued that the extremely 
short maturity structure of the public debt by the end of 1994 was 
a major determinant of the economic crisis that erupted then.
1 De-
spite the dangers it encompasses, the fact that short-term debt is 
very commonly used calls for a search of its rationale based on first 
principles. 
In this paper we examine the rational choice of the debt maturity 
structure within an optimal contracting framework when there are 
informational asymmetries in financial markets. The role of agency 
problems in financial markets has long been recognized as crucial in 
the understanding of widespread features -such as credit rationing-
that differentiate these markets from other markets where textbook 
analysis of supply and demand works well. We consider a situation in 
which the country has initial private information about its develop-
ment project, and there will be two types of news before the project 
matures. First, future news will reduce the asymmetry of information 
between the country and its investors. Second, international interest 
rates may change. Moreover, the situation we consider allows for 
certain adjustments in the country's economy before the project ma-
tures. These adjustments stop the course of the project as it was 
originally planned, and imply a partial loss of the initial investment. 
But, by stopping the project, they also avoid the realization of the 
worst-case scenario. 
We carry out our analysis in two different stages. We first derive 
the optimal financial contract when the country has access to any 
financial contract that provides nonnegative returns to investors, i.e., 
we consider complete financial contracting. This allows us to describe 
the tasks that a financial contract must accomplish to optimize use 
of future information. To gain more insight, we consider separately 
cases in which only one type of information will arrive between the 
time investment takes place and the time the project matures. We 
first consider the case in which interest rates may rise, but there will 
1 See for instance Cole and Kehoe (1996) for an analysis that emphasizes this 
view within a rigorous framework. Other related articles are Calvo and Mendoza 
(1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996). OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 39 
be no more information regarding the country's project itself. We 
then analyze the cases in which there is no interest-rate risk, and in 
which there is uncertainty in both interest-rate movements and news 
about the country's project. 
Our analysis of complete contracting yields insights into how 
financial contracts should be designed to optimize use of future infor-
mation. First, when there is only interest-rate uncertainty, financial 
contracting should avoid any risk that the project will be canceled. 
It should also optimize risk sharing. This means that the country 
should not bear the risk of interest rate movements, which are not 
under its control. 
When future news refers not only to interest rate movements, but 
also to information on the country's project, we have a very differ-
ent picture. Optimal contracting may have to consider canceling the 
project if the news is sufficiently bad. Countries with good projects 
may optimally accept this risk in exchange for the smaller expected 
repayment it implies. Indeed, by intervening quickly when bad sig-
nals arrive, expected repayments from bad projects increase. Under 
competitive capital markets, this translates into smaller repayments 
from good projects. Thus, a country with a good project is willing to 
accept the risk of (inefficiently) suffering an adjustment in its project 
if there is bad news, because it is confident that the news will most 
likely be good, and the reduction in debt repayments this risk allows 
is substantial. Another feature that optimal contracting should ex-
hibit is that repayments should also be contingent on future news 
about the country's project. Countries with good projects are will-
ing to set higher repayments after bad news in exchange for smaller 
repayments under good news because they are less likely than coun-
tries with bad projects to get bad news. Thus, expected repayments 
from bad projects increase, which allows for a reduction in expected 
repayments from good projects. 
In a second stage, we constrain the country to using only two 
different instruments. One is short-term debt, which comes due be-
fore the project matures, but after the change in interest rates and 
information about the country's project become known. The second 
is long-term debt that comes due after the project matures. 
When there is only interest-rate risk, pure long term debt is op-
timal. It guarantees that the country will not need to come back 
to the capital markets before the project matures, and thus, there 
is no risk of the project having to be adjusted. It also ensures that 
the country will be isolated from movements in international inter-
est rates. Thus, pure long-term debt replicates the optimal contract 40 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
under complete financing. When there will be news about the coun-
try's project, but there is no interest-rate risk, short-term debt plays 
a crucial role, and is critical in order to replicate the contract that is 
optimal under complete contracting. When the country finances with 
pure long-term debt, it does not allow for adjustments of the project 
after bad news. Thus, if such an adjustment is optimal, it will be 
better to use short-term debt. Then, the country will have to come 
back to the capital markets and, if these markets' assessment of the 
quality of its project is negative, the country will be unable to refi-
nance its liabilities. This, in turn, will force the country to accept an 
adjustment in its project. Even when no such adjustment is optimal, 
short-term debt is useful because it makes repayments depend on fu-
ture news. Indeed, with short-term debt, the country will refinance 
its debt at terms that will depend on future news. 
Finally, when there is both risk of interest rate movements and 
news regarding the country's project, we find that the same forces 
driving the optimal debt maturity structure described above continue 
to make optimal the use of short-term debt. A mixture of short-
term and long-term debt can no longer replicate the optimal financial 
contract under complete contracting. 
The analysis of financial contracting under two different frame-
works helps to enhance our understanding of the tradeoffs of different 
forms of financing. The complete contracts approach provides us with 
a clear picture of how optimal contracts should be designed to take 
advantage of different types of information accruing during the life of 
a project. It also provides us with a benchmark against which actual 
contracts can be compared. On the other hand, the debt markets 
approach is a better representation of the situation faced by a de-
veloping country. Indeed, financial contracts that make it possible 
to establish a different set of obligations for each possible realization 
of a set of random variables over a long period of time are simply 
not available to a developing country. We choose to capture this fact 
with a model in which there is the possibility of a hike in the interest 
rate and there are no markets to insure against this risk. But, more 
generally, there may be othGr variables over which the country has 
no control and cannot be contracted upon. The international interest 
rate is but one of several such variables that provides a simple way to 
depart from the complete contracting framework. This variable, ad-
ditionally, has indeed been at the heart of international debt crises: 
While nominal interest rates as measured by LIBOR, averaged 8 
2 See, for instance, Dornbusch (1989). OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 41 
percent in the 1970's, they were 14.4 percent in 1980, and reached 
16.5 percent in 1981. Moreover, if one uses the rate of inflation in 
world trade (the industrial countries' unit export value) to deflate 
LIBOR, one obtains an average negative interest rate (-3.4 percent) 
for the 1970's, 1.4 percent in 1980 and 20.6 percent in 1981. There is 
widespread consensus that this increase in international interest rates 
played a major role in the onset of the 1982 international debt crisis. 
From a formal point of view, our model is closest to Diamond 
(1991). Yet, both our setup and the focus of our analysis is differ-
ent. First, with respect to the setup, in Diamond's model there is 
only one kind of intermediate news, while in ours there are news both 
about the country's project and a variable not directly related to its 
project -international interest rates. Second, in Diamond, borrowers 
are risk neutral, while here the country is risk-averse, which intro-
duces risk-sharing issues. With respect to the focus of the analysis, 
Diamond focuses on the choice of either short-term or long-term debt 
for different prior probabilities of the borrower being of a good type 
-which he interprets as the borrower's rating. In contrast, we focus 
on the ability of debt contracts to accomplish the tasks performed 
by complete contracts under a risky environment and on the reasons 
why the use of (at least some) short-term debt may be optimal in 
such an environment. 
Our paper is also related to the literature exploring conditions 
under which simple debt contracts are optimal, as in the costly state 
verification model of Gale and Hellwig (1985) in which the profits 
made by the firm can be observed only at a cost. The optimal con-
tract resembles a debt contract, in that the investor inspects (and 
confiscates all of the firm's profits) only if profits are low. More re-
cently, Krasa and Villamil (2000) analyze a model with limited com-
mitment to payment and enforcement decisions, and find conditions 
under which simple debt is the optimal contract. Our model differs 
from this literature in that we assume the observability of income and 
the commitment to payment, and so there is no room for studying 
either costly state verification or enforcement decisions. 
2. The model 
In this section we present a model in the spirit of Diamond (1991, 
1993). It is a model in which a country needs funds to undertake its 
development project, and has private information about the quality 
of such a project. Before the project matures, different types of news 
will arrive and it will be possible to alter the project. 42 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
2.1. The project and the timing 
A country has access to a project needing an outlay of I. The project's 
life extends over three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0 the country 
raises I in a competitive credit market through a financial contract 
that provides nonnegative expected returns to investors. At t = 1, 
information arrives and (at least) some of the amounts invested can 
be safeguarded by adjusting the country's economy. This adjustment 
implies that the project may be partially or totally canceled. At t 
= 2 the project matures and produces income.
3 With this timing, 
we capture the fact that after the project has been undertaken and 
new information has arrived, it is possible to ensure the recovery of 
(at least) some of the amounts invested by adjusting the country's 
project before it is completed. 
There are two types of projects, and only the country knows 
which project it has. A country with a good project obtains an income 
of X > I at t = 2, while a country with a bad project obtains X with 
probability TT and 0 otherwise, with ixX < I. Thus, under symmetric 
information countries with bad projects would not receive financing. 
However, investors do not know if a country has a bad project. At 
date zero, they assign the country a probability / of having a good 
project. Therefore, there is a probability q = [/ + (1 - /)TT] that the 
country's date-two income will be X. 
The project can be canceled or reduced before it matures. This 
eliminates (or at least reduces) the uncertainty in the country's in-
come, from the investor's perspective. If a project is completely can-
celed, it yields L < I at date 2, whether it is good or bad. If 100 
4> percent of the project is canceled (0 < 4> < 1), the project will 
yield <f)L for sure plus another return that depends on its type. A 
good project will yield an additional (1 - tj>) X for sure while a bad 
one will yield an additional (1 - <j>) X with probability TT and 0 oth-
erwise. Thus, cancellation of 100 <j> percent of the project still allows 
the remaining 100 (l-cf>) percent of the project to be completed. Can-
cellation -even if it is only partial- is inefficient since it results in a 
loss of 0(1 — L): Resources are wasted if a project is undertaken and 
shut down before it yields its full results. 
Two kinds of news arrives prior to the maturity of the project, 
when it can still be adjusted: First, there is news about international 
risk-free interest rates. More precisely the one-period risk-free interest 
3 In Diamond (1991, 1993) all projects also produce a "control"rent at t=2 
which accrues to the borrower -and is not transferable- if there is no cancelation at 
t = 1. Including this rent would complicate matters without altering our results. OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 43 
rate will remain at zero with probability A, and will increase to i > 
0 with probability 1 - A. Second, there is news about the project 
itself that reduces the asymmetry of information between the country 
and its outside investors: The performance of the country's economy 
is observed by investors, who learn something about the country's 
project. This second type of news can be good, s = u (an upgrade 
of the country's rating takes place) or bad, s = d (a downgrade takes 
place). Good borrowers receive bad news with probability e, and bad 
borrowers with probability r, with e < r. 
The country maximizes its expected utility E u(Y), where Y is 
date-two income, net of repayments to investors, and «'() > 0, u"() < 
0. Capital markets are competitive, and are willing to invest as long 
as the expected discounted sum of net repayments from the country 
equals (or is higher than) zero. 
2.2. Updating beliefs 
After observing the realization of s, investors update their beliefs 
about the country's type. They do this by applying Bayes' rule. Let 
/<*(/") be the updated probability -according to Bayes' rule- that 
the country is good given bad (good) news. We have: 





u = v / w r (2) 
/(l-e) + (l-/)(l-r) 
Likewise, denote by q
d(q
u) the conditional probability that date-two 
income -if there is no adjustment- will be X given bad (good) news. 
3. Complete financial contracts 
We will consider different types of financial contracts. First, as a 
benchmark, we will consider in this section optimal contracts when 
complete financial contracting is possible. 
Under complete financial contracting, a financial contract spec-
ifies the repayment schedule -the repayments due under completion 
and cancellation of the project- and the percentage of cancellation, 




sn, for s=d,u, and n = c,i, where 4>
s
n de-
notes the fraction of liquidation, L
sn(R
sn) the repayment due to in-
vestors under cancellation (completion) of the project, and the super-
scripts refer to date-one news. The first superscript indicates whether 
there are good (s = u) or bad (s = d) news about the country's 
project, and the second one whether interest rates remain unchanged 
(n = c), or raise to i(n = h). 
We will also consider in the next section the case (in the spirit of 
Diamond 1991, 1993) when the country is restricted to raising funds, 
at t = 0, by issuing short-term debt that matures at t = 1, after the 
news is released, and long-term debt that comes due at the completion 
of the project (at t= 2). Since short-term debt will come due before 
the project matures, the country will refinance this debt by borrowing 
again at the credit market. 
When analyzing both complete financial contracts and short-
term and long-term debt contracts, we will concentrate, as Flan-
nery (1986) and Diamond (1991, 1993) do, on the contract preferred 
by good quality borrowers among the pooling equilibrium contracts. 
This means that we will study a situation in which all countries of-
fer the same contract, which is the one preferred by good quality 
countries among those able to attract financing. Thus, in the case of 
complete financial contracting, the optimal contract solves 
Program (1): 
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snL, 0 < 4>
s
n < 1 for 
s = d,u, and n = c,h, OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 45 
Let us interpret this program. Constraint (3) establishes that the 
contract is profitable for investors. With probability [/e+(l-/)r](l-
A) there will be bad news about the project (s = d) and a hike in the 
interest rate (n = h). In such a case, a fraction ^ of the project is 
canceled and the country gets an income 4>
dhL with certainty plus an 
income (1 - <f>
sn)X with probability q




sure and an additional R
d
h
 with probability q




guaranteed because it is smaller than <f>




be thought of as the part of the income not subject to uncertainty 
[4>
dhL) that goes to investors. The amount R
d
h
 < (1 - cf>
dh)X is 
repaid only if there is a good realization of the country's income which, 
given the bad date-one news about the country's project, occurs with 
probability q
d. Thus, we may interpret R
d
h
 as the part of the income 
subject to uncertainty that goes to investors. The three other terms 
in the left hand side of constraint (3) have a similar interpretation. 
The objective function is the utility a good country obtains. 
With probability e(l - A), there will be bad news about the project 
and a hike in the interest rate. In such a case, a fraction cf>
dh of the 
project is canceled and the country's income is (1 - <f>
dh)X + 4>
dhL, 




dhA The three 
other terms in the objective function can be interpreted in an analo-
gous way. 
Given the existence of limited liability, if the country is able to 
attract financing it will find in its interest to carry out the project. 
To be able to attract financing, the country must find a contract 
that satisfies the constraints of the above program. To see if such 









snL for all s, all n. Then null 
adjustment of the project after good news, can 
do this because if it were optimal to adjust the project even after 
good news, the project would surely not attract funds (because L < 
I). Now maximizing the returns to investors (the left hand side of (3)) 
with respect to <j>
dh and 4>
d
c we obtain that the project will attract 
financing if 
Max{[/e + (1 - f)r]L + [f(l - e) + (1 - /)(1 - r)}q
uX, qX} (4) 
> [A + (l-A)(l + i)]7 
The first term in the maximand obtains when the country's 
project is adjusted after bad news {4>
d
h = 4*° = 1): with proba-
bility [fe + (1 - f)r] bad news will indeed occur, in which case the 
4 Notice that, given a certain fraction of liquidation, a good country (privately) 
knows its (gross) income without any uncertainty. 46 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
project will be liquidated and repayment will equal L. With probabil-
ity [/(l-e) + (l-/)(l-r)] there will be good news about the project, 
which will then be completed and yield expected repayments of q
uX. 
The second term in the maximand (qX) obtains when the project is 
always completed, no matter what date-one news are received. 
Note that even if qX < [X + (1 - A)(l + the project may 
still attract financing. In this case, if the project is undertaken and 
investors wait for its full completion, they will lose money -in expected 
value. Yet, if the project is carried out to its full completion only if 
there are good news, but is adjusted after bad news (<f>
dn = 1), it will 
yield expected repayments sufficient to attract financing. 
We now present the optimal financial contract for different sets of 
conditions about future information. First, we examine what happens 
when the only new information that will arrive prior to the maturity 
of the project is whether or not interest rates rise. Thus, the following 
proposition (whose proof is in the appendix) characterizes the optimal 
complete financial contract when future information will not reduce 
the asymmetry of information between the country and its creditors. 
PROPOSITION l. When future news will not reduce the asymme-
try of information between the country and its investors regarding the 
country's type (e = r), the optimal financial contract establishes that: 
i) The country's project suffers no adjustment, no matter what 
date-one information arrives, 4>
s
n = 0 for s = d, u; n = h, c. 
ii) The repayments due at the completion of the project do not 
depend on date-one information, R
s
n
 = [X + (l-X)(l+i)]I/q, for s = 
d,u;n = h,c. 
When the asymmetry of information between the country and its 
outside investors will not be reduced, the optimal form of financing 
should guarantee that the country's project is never adjusted, and 
that the repayments remain the same no matter what news is received 
in the future. The reason for the first feature is simply that since the 
project was worth undertaking in the first place, it remains so due to 
the lack of new information on its nature. With regard to the second 
feature, since the country is risk averse and investors risk neutral -
presumably because they hold a diversified portfolio- it is optimal to 
have investors bear the whole risk of variables not under the control 
of the country. This results in constant repayments across all states 
of nature. 
We now examine what happens when, in contrast to the case ana-
lyzed in proposition 1, future news reduces the asymmetry of informa-
tion between the country and its investors. The following proposition 
(whose proof is in the appendix) characterizes the optimal complete OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 47 
financial contract under such circumstances. It is worth noting for fu-
ture reference, when we analyze debt financing, that this proposition 
characterizes the optimal contract under two different cases. First, it 
does so far the case where the only future information refers to the 
country's project because there is no risk of a rise in interest rates. 
This is a particular case of the result stated in the proposition, when i 
= 0. Second, it does so far the case where both interest rates may rise 
(z > 0), and future relevant information about the country's project 
will arrive. 
PROPOSITION 2. When future news reduces the asymmetry of in-
formation between the country and its investors, the optimal financial 
contract establishes that: 
i) After good news, the country's project suffers no adjustment, 
ii) Ifq
dX > L, the project suffers no adjustment after bad news 
either, <f>
dc = <f>
dh = 0, and repayments at date 2 depend on whether 
good or bad news arrives, but not on whether there is an increase in 
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h = 1), and the repayments are such that the country's net income 
(after debt repayments) is lower after bad news than after good news, 
but do not depend on whether there is an increase in the interest rate, 
0 < L - L
d
c
 = L - L
d
h
 < X - R
u
c
 = X - R
uh. 
News about the country's project provides two benefits: i) It 
allows a decrease in expected repayments from good countries by 
increasing those from bad countries, and ii) It helps to increase the 
quality of the surviving (unadjusted) projects, by adjusting projects 
that are most likely to be bad. To take advantage of the news, the 
optimal contract exhibits the following features: 
i) The country has to repay higher amounts if there is bad news. 
Countries with good projects accept this burden in exchange for re-
duced repayments following good news, because they are less likely 
than countries with bad projects to obtain bad news. 
ii) If future news regarding the quality of the project is bad 
enough and the cost of adjusting the project is not so high (L > q
dX), 
the project is adjusted after bad news. Countries with good projects 
accept this risk because they are confident that future news will most 
likely show that their projects are good, and that by taking this risk 
they substantially reduce their financing costs. These costs are re-
duced because bad projects yield higher returns when they are ad-
justed than when they are not. Under competitive capital markets, 
this increase in repayments from bad projects translates into lower 48 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
repayments from good projects. Moreover, under some parameter 
constellations, i.e., qX < I the existence of accurate date-one in-
formation that triggers the project's adjustment when it is bad is a 
necessary condition for the project to attract financing. 
4. Short-term and long-term debt 
Consider now the case in which the country has access to only two 
financial instruments to raise the necessary funds to undertake the 
project. These instruments are short-term debt and long-term debt, 
as in Diamond (1991, 1993). The country can issue short-term debt 
with nominal value 5X that matures at t= 1, after interim news is 
released, and long-term debt with nominal value D, that comes due 
after the project is completed at t = 2. How can Si be repaid if the 
project has not yield any income? By raising funds again in the credit 
market. At t = 1 the country has access again to a competitive credit 
market in which it can raise funds promising up to (X - D), that is, 
the part of the resources that will not be needed to repay long-term 
debt. Thus, at t = 1, the country issues short-term debt with face 
value S2 that comes due at t = 2. If the country is unable to raise the 
necessary funds to repay Si, the country's project is adjusted. Figure 
1 illustrates the functioning of the credit market. 
We now need to establish several relationships between the dif-
ferent types of debt. First, let us find how much debt the country 
must issue at date 1 to borrow the necessary funds to repay 5X. This 
depends on whether good (s = u) or bad (s = d) news about the 
quality of the project arrives, and whether the interest rate remains 
at zero (n = c), or rises to i > 0(n = h). To borrow Sx at t = 1, the 
country must issue debt with face value S2 satisfying: 
S2 = Si(l + i)/q
u if s = u,n = h 
S2=S\/q
u if s = u,n = c 
S2= S1(l+i)/q
d if s = d,n=h 
S2=S1/q
d if s = d,n = c OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 49 
Figure 1 
Country borrows I 





/=0  t--l 
To see why this is so, consider for instance the case s = u,n=h 
(the explanation for the other cases is similar). Since there is good 
news about the project (a = u), financial markets expect that it will 
yield X with probability q
u. This is the probability with which the 
country will repay the debt S2. Thus, the expected repayment from a 
debt with face value S2 is q
uS2. Therefore, short-term debt S2 offers 
an expected (gross) rate of return of q
uS2/S1 which must equal the 
(gross) interest rate 1 + i, from where S2 = Si(l + i)/q
u follows. 
Now, if default is avoided for all date-one news, financing through 
a mixture of short-term and long-term debt (Si,D) implies the fol-
lowing repayments at t = 2: 






 = D + Si/q
u 
R  dh .  D + Si(l + i)/q
d 
R
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To see why consider, for instance, condition (5). The country 
must repay long-term debt with face value D, plus short-term debt 
with face value S2. We obtain (5) by replacing S2 with the value it 
takes when s = «andn = L 
Let us now examine how the country should finance its invest-
ment using only short-term and long-term debt under different sets 
of conditions about future news. We will first consider the case in 
which adjustment of the project would be optimally avoided under 
complete contracting, L < q
dX. We will consider in subsection 4.4. 
the opposite case. 
4.1. Financing when future news about the country's project is unin¬
formative 
Consider the case in which future information will not reduce the 
asymmetry of information between the country and its creditors, e = 
r. We then have q
u = q
d = q. 
Proposition 1 tells us that the optimum under complete contract-
ing is achieved when financial liabilities guarantee that the project is 
never canceled and repayments are equal across all states of nature, 
R™ = [A + (1 — \)(l + i)}I/q, for s = d,u;n = h,c. 
Thus, the optimum under complete contracting can be achieved 
with a mixture of short-term and long-term debt if a pair (SltD) 
exists, such that R
s
n




 are given by conditions (5-8) and q
u = q
d = q. Thus, this 
optimum can be achieved (note that (7) and (8) become redundant) 
when: 
D + 5j(l + i)/q = [A + (1 - A)(l + i)]I/q (9) 
D+S1/q=[\ + (l-\)(l + i)]I/q (10) 
which hold simultaneously for 
D =[\ + (l- \)(l + i)}I/q, Si = 0. (11) 
Thus, even though only short-term and long-term debt are avail-
able, the country is able to replicate the optimal financial contract 
under complete contracting. The country accomplishes this by issuing 
only long-term debt. 
It is worth comparing the interest rate on different kinds of fi-
nancing. With long-term debt, the country raises I and promises to OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 51 
pay [A + (1 — A)(l + i))I/q. Thus, the nominal interest rate on the 
country's long-term debt is [A + (l-A)(H-i)]/g-l > 0. Although the 
risk-free interest rate is zero for a short-term loan to be reimbursed 
at t = 1, the country has to pay an interest rate above zero on its 
long-term debt, for two reasons. First, the loan may not be repaid: 
This occurs when the project fails, which has a probability of (1 - ?), 
and accounts for the q term in the expression for the nominal interest 
rate. Second, interest rates may rise at t = 1 to i, which occurs 
with probability (1 - A) and explains the rest of the deviation of the 
country's long-term interest rate from zero. 
Short- term debt is cheaper in the sense that a loan that is repaid 
for sure at date one pays an interest rate equal to zero, while a loan 
that will be repaid with certainty at i = 2 pays an interest rate 
of (1 - A)i. Yet, the proper comparison for the country is between 
issuing long-term debt and issuing short-term debt and refinancing it 
at t = 1. The country will pay zero interest rate on its short-term 
debt issued at date zero, but it will pay a (gross) interest rate of l/q 
with probability A and (1 + i)/q with probability (1 - A) on the debt 
it will issue at date one (to repay the debt maturing at this same 
date). Thus, the country will pay an expected net interest rate for 
short-term financing of {[A + (1 - A)(l + i)\/q} - 1: the expected 
interest rate is the same for both short-term and long-term types of 
financing. 
Summing up, although the interest rate on short-term debt is 
lower than that on long-term debt issued at the same date, the ex-
pected cost of both forms of financing are equal. The country thus 
optimally finances with pure long-term debt because it is risk-averse 
and, in contrast with short-term debt, long-term debt guarantees en-
sure completion of the project and a constant repayment schedule. 
4.2. Financing without interest rate uncertainty 
Consider now the case in which future news will reduce the asymmetry 
of information between the country and its investors, r > e, but there 
is no interest rate uncertainty, i = 0. From proposition 2, we know 













 < X if q
dX > L. This contract can be replicated 
with a mixture of short-term and long-term debt if there is a pair 
(Su D) that can produce the desired R
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These two equations have a unique solution in (Sj, D), and this solu-
tion replicates the contract that is optimal under complete contract-
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This means that it is optimal to use short-term, refinanciable 
debt. The reason is that this debt, unlike long-term debt, makes the 
cost of funds depend on future news, and good borrowers know that 
they are more likely than bad borrowers to get good news. Thus, 
it is optimal to use short-term debt because it decreases expected 
repayments from good borrowers by raising expected repayments from 
bad borrowers. 
4.3. Financing with two types of future information 
Consider now the case in which at date one new information regarding 
both the country's project and interest rates will arrive, r > e and i > 
0. According to proposition 2, under complete financial contracting 
it is optimal not to make date-two repayments contingent on interest 













Equations (5-8) transform into 












and there is no pair (SltD) that simultaneously solves these four 
equations. To see why, suppose the contrary. Then, (16) and (17) OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 53 
imply Si = 0. Yet, substituting Sx = 0 in (17) and (19) we get 
R
u = R
d, a contradiction. So, a mixture of short-term and long-term 
debt, even if optimally designed, is not able to achieve what complete 
financial contracts can. We now look for the optimal debt contract. 
It is the pair (S^D) that solves 
Program (2): 
Maximize e(l - X)u(X - S:(l + i)/g
d - D) + e\u(X - S/q
d - D) 
+(1 - e)(l - X)u(X - S(l - i)jq
u - D) + (1 - e)Xu(X - S/q
u - D) 
s.t. 
D\f + (1 — /)7r] + Si[A + (1 — A)(l + i)] (20) 
> [A + (1 — A)(l -f 
As is shown in the appendix, the solution of this program lies 
at Sx > 0: It is optimal to finance with positive short-term debt. 
To see why, suppose that the country finances only with long-term 
debt. Then, the country retains the same income for all realizations 
of date-one news. As a result, the marginal utility of net income is the 
same across all realizations of date-one news. Yet, at this point, an 
increase in short-term debt increases the repayments a "good" country 
makes in bad states by less than what it reduces the repayments it 
makes in good states. The reason is, just as before, that short-term 
debt decreases expected repayments from good borrowers by raising 
expected repayments from bad borrowers. Therefore, it is optimal to 
finance (at least partially) with short-term debt. 
4.4. Financing when it is optimal to adjust the project 
Up to now we have examined cases in which the mixture of short-term 
and long-term debt does not cause any adjustment in the project. 
Indeed, in all the cases studied so far, we have restricted our attention 
to situations in which the country is able to repay the short-term 
debt that matures at date one by issuing new short-term debt that 
matures at date two. Yet, as we know from proposition two, this is 
not necessarily optimal. We now examine what happens when it is 
optimal to adjust the project at date one. We know from proposition 2 
that when complete contracting is possible and q
dX < L, the optimal 
contract cancels the project after bad news (^ = <t>
d
h = 1), and sets 54 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
repayments that do not depend on whether interest rates rise and 
that satisfy 0 < L - L
d
c
 = L - L
d
h
 < X - R
u
c













d. Under optimal complete 
contracting, when the date one news about the project is good, the 
project is not adjusted and repayments are R
u < X regardless of news 
about interest rates. On the other hand, when date-one news about 
the project is bad, the project is adjusted but, again, repayments 
L
d < L do not depend on interest rates news. 
We now examine whether we can replicate the above contract 
with a mixture of short-term and long-term debt. We will assume 
throughout that when the debt that comes due at date one cannot be 
repaid, that is, when the state s in {d, u} occurs at date 1 and Si, D 
are such that Si > qs(X - D), the project is adjusted, <j> = 1, and 
creditors recover at date 2 min {Si(l + i) + D,L}. Under this (polar 
case) assumption, creditors can enforce repayment of the country's 
debt up to the country's full income. 
4.4.1. Absence of interest rate uncertainty 
Assume first that there is no interest rate uncertainty, i = 0. The 
condition 
must hold for the project to be adjusted after bad news (s = d), as 
required by the optimal contract under complete contracting. This 
condition states that the country will be unable to meet the repay-
ments Si at date one when bad news about its project arrives. 
On the other hand, the condition 
must hold to avoid the adjustment of the project after good news: 
The country should be able to meet its date-one repayments Si when 
date-one news about its project is good. 
Given that conditions (21) and (22) hold, the repayments pre-
scribed by optimal complete contracting will be replicated if the fol-
lowing two conditions hold: 
Si >q
d(X-D)  (21) 
Si < q
u(X - D)  (22) 
D + Si/q
u =  (23) 
Min{£> +SltL} = L
d  (24) OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 55 
Condition (23) is the same as condition (12), because both conditions 
refer to a situation where the project should continue as originally 
planned. To interpret condition (24) notice first that, given condition 
(21), the country cannot raise enough money to meet its financial 
obligations after bad news and, therefore, the project is canceled. 
As a result, the country's income is L. Condition (24) reflects the 
assumption that creditors can collect as much as they need from the 
country's income to enforce repayment of (D + Si). Since the optimal 
contract under complete contracting shows L
d < L, condition (24) 
implies that D + Sx < L and is equivalent to 
D + Sj = L
d (24-) 
Thus, the optimal contract under complete contracting can be 
replicated by a mixture (SltD) of short-term and long-term debt if 
conditions (21), (22), (23) and (24') hold. To see if this is the case, we 
can solve for (Sj, D) in equations (23) and (24'). These two equations 









D = — —— (26) 
(l-g«) 
Thus, the optimal contract under complete contracting will be 
replicated if the pair (SUD) in (25) and (26) satisfies conditions (21) 
and (22). 

















Condition (27) holds because i) q
uR
u > L -since otherwise the 
investors 'participation constraint would not be met, ii) L > q
dX and 
iii) L > L
d, as simple algebra shows. 
On the other hand, the fact that R
u < X, together with condi-
tion (23), implies that D + S1/q
u < X, from which condition (22) 
follows. 56 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Summing up, when there is no interest risk uncertainty, debt 
contracting can replicate optimal complete contracting. 
4.4.2. Interest rate uncertainty 
When there is interest rate uncertainty (i > 0), the optimal contract 
under complete contracting isolates the country from interest rate 
variations so that repayments remain constant across different real-












Thus, in addition to satisfying conditions (21) and (22) to ensure the 




D + S1{l + i)/q
u= R
u (29) 
D + Si = L
d (30) 
D + S1{l + i) = L
d (31) 
Yet, there is no pair (£>,Si) that simultaneously solves (28)-(31), 
because (28) and (29) imply Si = 0 which, together with (30) and 
(31), implies that i = 0. 
If we restrict ourselves to a mixture of short-term and long-term 
debt we find that there are two reasons to recommend the use of short-
term debt. First, if we set Sx = 0, condition (21) will not be satisfied 
and the project will not be adjusted after bad news. Second, even 
in the class of debt contracts that produce no adjustment, it is not 
optimal to set Si = 0. The proof and the intuition here are identical 
to the case when continuation of the project is always optimal: By 
using only long-term debt, the country's income would be the same 
for all realizations of date-one news. In such a situation, however, 
an increase in short-term debt would benefit a country with a good 
project, because it would make repayments contingent on news about 
the country's project. Since countries with good projects are more 
likely to get good news, the rise in the repayments they make after bad 
news is more than compensated by the reduction in their repayments 
after good news. 
The discussion in section 4 has analyzed how and why the country 
should finance its project when it is restricted to using a mixture of 
short-term and long-term debt. The following proposition does not 
repeat the whole argument, but only states the optimality of the use 
of short-term debt. OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 57 
PROPOSITION 3. If the country is constrained to finance its develop-
ment project with a mixture of short-term and long-term debt (Si, D), 
then pure long-term debt is optimal if e = r. Otherwise, the optimal 
mixture of short-term and long-term debt exhibits Sx > 0. 
5. Example 
We now present a worked example to illustrate what the debt matu-
rity structure may look like and how it might change under different 
circumstances, and to give an idea of the utility loss when complete 
contracts are not available. 
Assume a utility function u(i)=lni, and the following param-
eter values: 
/ = 1/2, e = 1/4, r = 1/2, TT = 1/2, L = 1/8, X = 15/8. These 
values imply q = 3/4, q
d = 2/3, and q
u = 4/5. 
i) Assume first that i = 0, so that there is no interest rate un-
certainty. 
Under complete contracting, the optimal financial contract es-
tablishes that the project should never be adjusted (4>
d = <f>










 = 0), that repayments should not 
depend on interest rates, and that they should be higher after bad 






 = 81/64 = 1.2652 < R
d
h
 = R^ 
= 47/32 =1.4688 < X. 
A mixture of short-term and long-term debt can replicate the 
above contract. It does so when Si = 13/16 = 0.8125 and D = 1/4 
= 0.25: Short-term debt is more than three quarters of total debt. 
This mixture of short-term and long-term debt replicates the optimal 
contract because it produces repayment obligations of: 
D + Si/q
u = 81/64 = 1.2652 after good news (s = u), and 
D + Si/q
d = 47/32 = 1.4688 after bad news (s = d). 
ii) Assume now that the interest rate will raise to i = 1/4 with 
probability A = 1/ 2. 
Under complete contracting, the optimal financial contract sets 
again (f>
d = <j>
u = 0 (and thus L
d = L







93/64= 1.4531 < R
d
h
 = R^ = 51/32 = 1.59375 < X. Note that, 
even though there is interest rate uncertainty, the country's repay-
ment obligations do not depend on interest-rate movements. 
A mixture of short-term and long-term debt can no longer repli-
cate the above contract. The optimal debt contract sets Si = 0.1991 
and D = 1.2014, with short-term debt representing about 14 per-
cent of total debt. This mixture of short-term and long-term debt 58 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 





 =D + Sx(l +i)/q




 = D + Si/q




 = D + 5i(l + i)/q




 = D + Si/q
d = 1.5 
We can express the loss experienced by the country from having 
to rely on debt markets rather than on complete contracts as fol-
lows. Let H^ia) be the maximum utility the country can get when 
complete contracting is available and it has to guarantee investors an 
expected repayment of [A+(l-A)(l + i)]/+a. Let H
D
C
 be the maxi-
mum utility the country can obtain with debt financing. This amount 
guarantees investors an expected repayment of [A + (1-A)(1-H)]L Let 
a* be such that H
cc(a*) = H
DC. Then, in this example, a* = 0.0028. 
So, the country would be willing to pay 0.0028, or 0.28 percent of the 
initial investment, to have access to a complete contract rather than 
to simple debt contracting. Thus, the welfare loss from not having 
access to a complete contract is not very big. On the other hand, 
the changes in the debt maturity structure are much bigger. While 
short-term debt is about three quarters of total debt when there is 
no uncertainty in interest rates, it is less than a sixth when interest 
rates may rise. 
6. Conclusions 
We have analyzed a model in which a risk-averse country needs to 
finance its development project under adverse selection. Before the 
project matures there will be two types of news. One of them refers to 
the country's project, and may reduce the asymmetry of information 
between the country and its investors. The other one refers to a 
variable that does not have a direct link to the country's project, 
nor is it under the control of the country, international interest rates. 
The project can be adjusted at a loss after the news just mentioned 
become known. OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 59 
We have examined the optimal way to finance the project both 
under complete financial contracting, and when the country is re-
stricted to using only short and long-term debt. We have found the 
characteristics that a financial contract should have to make optimal 
use of future information. When the country is limited to using only 
short and long-term debt, it is in general unable to replicate the con-
tract that is optimal under complete contracting. In this situation, 
the country finds it in its interest to use short-term debt, except in 
the case in which future news is completely uninformative about the 
country's project. 
We have identified three main reasons why a country should use 
short-term debt. 
First, the country may simply not be able to attract long-term 
financing, and may instead have to resort to short-term debt. This 
occurs in our model when qX < I. In this case, investors perceive 
a small probability of the project succeeding, either because they as-
sign too low a probability that the country has a good project, or 
because good projects do not have a high enough rate of return to 
compensate for the fact that the project may not be worth undertak-
ing after all. Thus, if investors had to lend the amount required for 
the investment and wait until the completion of the project for their 
returns, they would expect to lose money, and therefore they do not 
finance the project. Yet, short-term debt raises the expected amount 
investors receive. This is because informative news will arrive at a 
time when it is possible to adjust the project in a way that avoids the 
worst-case scenario, and ensures the recovery of a large amount of the 
initial investment. We are dealing here with projects for which future 
news will be accurate and at the time they arrive adjustments that 
ensure the recovery of substantial amounts of the initial investment 
are available. 
Second, even when the country is able to finance with pure long-
term debt, short-term debt could still be optimal. By issuing short-
term debt, the country effectively conditions the survival of its de-
velopment project as originally planned on the realization of future 
news. If bad news arrives in the future, the country will not be able 
to refinance its debt and will have to accept some form of intervention 
that will result in an adjustment of its project so that it provides more 
certainty to investors, for instance, a stabilization policy. Countries 
with good projects accept the risk of suffering the loss due to the 
possible adjustment because they are confident that future news will 
most likely show that their projects are indeed good, and that they 
will thus be able to raise the cash needed to repay its short- term debt 60 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
and avoid any adjustment. The risk of adjustment is therefore small 
when compared with the substantial reduction in debt payments al-
lowed by the use of short-term debt. This reduction occurs because 
bad projects yield better outcomes if they are intervened upon before 
their completion. This timely intervention translates into higher re-
payments from bad projects and, under competitive credit markets, 
ultimately translates into lower repayments from good borrowers. 
Third, and closely related to the previous reason, a country 
should use short term debt because it allows the expected interest-
rate to depend on future news about its project. Countries with good 
projects are confident that financial markets' future assessments of 
their projects will be good and that, therefore, they will be able to 
refinance their debt at better terms. 
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Appendix 
Proof of propositions 1 and 2 





sn, for s=u,d, 
and n = c, h, so as to solve program (1): 
Max H = e(l - A)u((l - 4>
dh)X - R + <t>
dhL - L
dh) 
+eAu((l - - R^ + - L^) 










































 < (1 - ct>




snL, 0 < 4>
s
n < 1 for 5 = 
d,u, and n= c,h. 
i) At an optimum, constraint (3) holds with equality. Otherwise, 




dh, still satisfy this constraint, and 
improve the objective function. 
ii) If at an optimum 4>
s




snL, for s = u, d 
and n= h, c. For ease of exposition, let us prove this assertion for 
s = u and n = h only. The proofs for the other cases are similar. 
Since at an optimum (3) holds with equality, solve then for R
u
h
 as a 62 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
function of the rest of the decision variables, replace it in the objective 
function and ignore constraint (3). Call the new objective function 
(which does not have R
u
h
 as an argument) V( ). We obtain: 
-^1- = (1 - e)(l - A)u'(-) ^-1 + > 0. 




uhL is binding, 







 = 0. 
To see why, set 4>
u




uhL. Let W be 
the function V( ) when L
u
h
 is replaced by 4>
uhL. We have 
dW 
—  = (1 - e)(l - A)« (•) ( -X + — ) < 0  /(•) (-X + ^ 
since L < q
uX. Thus, 0 < d>
u
h
 < 1 is not optimal. Simple compu-
tations show that <t>
u
h = 1 is not optimal either. Thus, cf>
u
h = 0 is 
optimal. The proof for 0
U
C
 is similar and thus omitted for brevity. 











dc = 1 if L > q
dX 




c = 0. But, since L may 
be higher or lower than q
dX, we may have <f>
d
h = ^ equal to 0 or 1. 
v) If L < q
dX, then <fi
sn = 0 is optimal for all s, all n. Replacing 
these values in program (1), we get L
s
n
 = 0 for all a, all n. Let R
u
h 
be implicitly defined by (3). By using again the function V as defined 
above, we have the first-order condition 
•> "•• -,dh\ 
= _e(i _ x)u'(X - R ) 







 ( >f(l-e) + (l-f)(l-r)K 
(some computations show that second-order conditions for a maxi-
mum are satisfied) from where OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 63 
u'(X - R
dh) _ /e(l - e) + (1 - /)r(l - e)7r 
u'(X - R
uh) ~ /e(l - e) + (1 - /)e(l - r)-n ~ ^ ' 
Now, the left hand side of (Al) is greater than one when r > e, 
and is equal to one when r = e. Thus, 
If r > e, then u (X - R
dh) > u (X - R
uh), which implies that 





On the other hand, 
dV 
= -e\u'{X - R^ 
implies 
(1 - e)(l - X)u'(X - R
uh)[fe + (1 - f)r*)\  
+ [/(l-e) + (l-/)(l-r)7r][l-A] 
u'{X - R^ _ /e(l _ e) + (1 _ /)r(i _ e)^ 
u'{X - R
uh) ~ /e(l - e) + (1 - /)e(l - r)n 
(A2) 
From (Al) and (A2), it follows that u'(X - R
40) = U'(X - R
dh), 
which implies ii^ = R
dfl. 
We also have that 
dV 
= -{\-e)\u'{X - R




 ( } 
which implies u'(X - R
uc) = u'(X - R













c = 0, R
d
h






 = 0, and using again the function 
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which implies u'(X - R
uc) = u
1 (X - R









(1 - e)(l - X)u'(X - R
uh)[fe + (1 - /)r]A 
[/(l-e) + (l-/)(l-r)jr][r-A] 
from where 
u'iL-Lte) fe(l -e) + (!-/)(! - e)r 
(A5) 
u'(X-R
uh) fe(l - e) + (1 - /)(1 - r)en 
Now, the left hand side of (A5) is higher than one, because: 
(1 - e)r = r - re > (e - re)ir = (1 - r)e7r. 
Thus, u'(L - L
40) > U'(X - R




On the other hand, 
= -c(l - X)u'{L - L
dh) 
(1 - e)(l — X)u'(X — R
uh)[fe + (1 - /)r] 




dh) /e(l-e) + (l-/)(l-e)r 
/e(l-e) + (l-/)(l-r)e7r 





Proof that Si > 0 in the optimal contract that solves program 
2 
The optimal contract under debt financing chooses {SX,D) so as to 
solve program 2: 
Max G{SX,D) = e(l - X)u(X - S(l + I)/q
d - D) OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 65 
+eXu(X - S/q
d - D) + (1 - e)(l - X)u{X - 5(1 - i)/q




D [f + (1 - f)A + Si [A + (1 - A)(l + i)] (20) 
> [A + (l- A)(l + i)]7 
Note first that at the optimum constraint (20) holds with equal-
ity. Otherwise, we could reduce either Sx or D and increase the 
objective function. 
Thus, (20) implicitly defines D as a function of Si. Let G(Si) 
be the objective function when D is replaced by such a function. We 
have that, at Si = 0: 
^- = u'(X-D)[X + (l+X)(l + i)} (A7) 
1 _ e_ _ (1-e)' 
_/ + (1 - /)TT q
d q
u 
(A7) is strictly positive if the last bracketed term is strictly positive. 
Now, when r = e, q
d = q
u = f + (1 - /)TT, and thus this term is zero. 





2/(l - /)(! - TT) 





holds if e < r, as some algebra shows. Thus, the optimal mixture of 
(Si, D) implies issuing a positive amount of short-term debt. | 